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Petition for Supreme Court Review

Supreme Ct No. 96433-5

Ct of Appeals No. 76553-1—I

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION I

Housing Authority of City of Seattle, Respondent,

v.

Stanley Maynor, Petitioner

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I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Petitioner is Stanley Maynor who was designated defendant and appellant in the Superior Court and Court of Appeals respectively.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FOR REVIEW

Stanley Maynor seek review of an unpublished Court of Appeals, Division One decision dated July 30, 2018. See Appendix to Petition for Review.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A. Did Superior Court Commissioner Judson proceed ultra vires on December 19, 2016? Was the December 19, 2016 proceeding an ex parte and uncontested proceeding within the meaning of RCW 2.24.040(9)? Do the procedures embodied in RCW 59.18 supplant RCW 59.12 procedures?

B. In addition to being void because rendered ultra vires are the judgments of December 19, 2016 and February 13, 2017 void for lack of in personam jurisdiction? Was the trial court empowered to adjudicate the merits of the plaintiff's action for money damages, or was the court required to dismiss the action?

C. Petitioner interposed insufficiency of service as an affirmative defense to plaintiff's claim the trial court was vested with jurisdiction over the property under authority RCW 59.18.055. Is the insufficiency of service defense established where, as here, the *plaintiff* endeavored to serve alternative process, notwithstanding CR 4(c), CR 4(c) states service shall

be by the sheriff of the county wherein the service is made, or by the sheriff's deputy, or by any person over 18 years of age who is competent to be a witness in the action, *other than a party*.

D. Is the judgment of February 13, 2017 void because SHA neglected to serve on Maynor either its Motion for restitution or its Certificate for an Order to Show Cause in violation of Civil Rule 5?

E, Did the trial court err by infringing upon Maynor's constitutional and Rule 5 – Rule 7(b)(1) right to notice?

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

“CP” citations refer to REVISED INDEX FILED in KING County Superior Court April 12, 2017. “Op” commends to the court’s attention COA decision dated July 30, 2018.

November 7, 2016 SHA filed a “COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER” [CP -1] SHA complained of damages, including Rental Damages and Sundry Damages [CP 1 2] SHA’s suit included a prayer for money judgment, “plaintiff’s costs and disbursements herein, including a reasonable attorney fees (sic).” [CP – 3]. Summons and Complaint has never been personally served on Maynor. [CP 41-43]

Based on SHA’s declaration it had hired a professional process server who was unable to serve petitioner, SHA was granted authority for alternative service per RCW 59.18.055. [CP 14-16 & 19]. Although SHA retained a professional process server to serve petitioner personally, plaintiff elected to execute alternative service itself, CR 4(c) to the contrary notwithstanding. For that reason, if alternative service has been accomplished such service was insufficient.

Petitioner’s answer denied each allegation of plaintiff’s complaint. Maynor interposed affirmative defenses including

- 1) lack of personal jurisdiction over the person of defendant; 2)
- insufficiency of service of process, and 3) lack of service of process.[CP

25-26]

SHA filed, but never served, [CP 23] [CP 24] [CP 29-30] a Motion for Restitution. [CP – 9] SHA filed [CP -9] but never served its Certificate for Order to Show Cause. [[CP 10] CP 23] [CP 24].

SHA's Declarations of Mailing dated November 18, 2016 and November 29, 2016 [CP 23; CP 24] verify Maynor's declaration that SHA did not serve him with its motion for restitution. [CP 29-30]. SHA's Declarations of Mailing dated November 28, 2016 and November 29, 2016 verify Maynor's declaration that SHA did not serve him with its Certificate in support of Motion to Show Cause for writ of restitution.

SHA's notice of its December 19, 2016 motion for restitution hearing did not notify Maynor as to what was at stake on December 19, 2016. [CP 17] SHA's notice of hearing concealed from Maynor the fact that SHA would seek relief different from and greater than recovery of the rental premises.. SHA' notice of December 19, 2016 motion hearing did not notify Maynor as to what "other" relief the court "may" grant IF and only if he did **not** appear. [CP – 17]

SHA's Motion [CP-9] and Certificate notified Maynor with particularity that the only relief SHA was seeking at the show cause hearing was an order of restitution. [CP 9] Likewise, SHA's order to show cause identified only one specified element of relief SHA was seeking at the

show cause hearing. SHA was seeking an order of restitution.

According to SHA's notice of hearing the court "may" could grant other unspecified relief if, and only if, Maynor did not appear at the appointed time and place as required. [CP 17 ¶2]. SHA did not notify Maynor of the legal hazards he was to encounter at the show cause hearing. [CP 17] [CP 41-43] The relief SHA sought, and the relief SHA was granted at the Show Cause hearing of December 19, 2016 was different from and greater than portrayed by the Notice SHA conveyed to Maynor. [CP 41-43] [CP-9] [CP 17], [CP 23] [CP 24] [CP 29-30] a Motion for Restitution. [CP – 9]

In addition to filing and serving an answer interposing several defenses to SHA's suit, [CP 25-26] Maynor filed and served "Partial Statement of Authorities" which served as his brief in opposition to SHA's motion for restitution, the only relief SHA disclosed it was seeking. [CP 27-30] Maynor's Statement of Authorities was submitted under oath [CP 30]SHA's notice of its December 19, 2016 motion for restitution hearing did not notify Maynor as to what was at stake on December 19, 2016. [CP – 17] SHA's notice of hearing concealed from Maynor the fact that SHA would seek relief different from and greater than recovery of the rental premises pendente lite. SHA' notice of December 19, 2016 motion hearing did not notify Maynor as to what "other" relief the court "may" grant IF and only if he

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SHA’s notice and the December 19, 2016 proceeding bore no resemblance. [CP 9] [CP 17] [CP 41-43] The commissioner entered money judgment against Maynor. [CP 41-43] The trial denied Maynor’s motion for revision after SHA claimed RCW 59.12.090 is applicable solely to commercial rentals. [CP 39-46; CP 79-88]

V. ARGUMENT

A. Grounds that qualify a case for review.

The Supreme Court will accept a case for review only if the petition involves an issue of substantial public interest, involves a significant question of law under the state or federal constitution, the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court, or the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with another published decision

of the Court of Appeals. RAP 13.4(b). This case satisfies all four grounds for review.

This petition for review should be granted because each of the criteria set forth in RAP 13.4(b) dictate acceptance of review. Petitioner understates the matter. The July 30, 2018 virtually begs for review and not merely because The COA's July 30, 2018 decision is spectacularly flawed. Review should be granted because this case is a case of first impression as to the issue of whether *vel-non* RCW 2.24.040(9) vests Superior Court commissioners with authority to preside over RCW 59.18 show cause hearings; i.e., is a RCW 59.18 show cause hearing an *ex parte* or uncontested proceeding where both parties are present and voice their conflicting views on the relevant issues.

It is an ineluctable fact that the COA's failure to reverse or even address the fact that the trial court's judgment is inherently antipodal to a court devoid of in personam jurisdiction demands review because it conflicts with numerous decisions of our Courts of Appeal, not to mention decisions of this court.

This petition raises procedural due process issues under both state and federal constitutions . . . issues which were decided in conflict with this jurisdiction's case law. It should not pass unnoticed that the COA's failure to address petitioner's insufficiency of alternative service also conflicts with

COA case law. See CR 4(c) and *Crouch v. Friedman*, 51 Wn. App. 731, 754 P.2d 1299 (1988) which held that service of process by the plaintiff himself was invalid citing CR 4(c). Maynor notes that the decision at issue which holds that RCW 59.12.090 “does not apply in this residential landlord case” is in conflict with at least three cases which hold that *Hous. Auth. v. Pleasant*, 126 Wn. App. 382 | 109 P.3d 422 (2005) ¶ 19. Because this case involves a residential tenancy, it is governed by the Residential Landlord–Tenant Act (RLTA) of 1973, chapter 59.18 RCW. *Leda v. Whisnand*, 150 Wash.App. 69, 77, 207 P.3d 468 (2009). However, the procedures set forth in the generalized unlawful detainer statutes, chapter 59.12 RCW, “apply to the extent they are not supplanted by those found in the [RLTA].” *Pleasant*, 126 Wash.App. at 390, 109 P.3d 422. However, as with any suit, where the written or oral presentations of the parties “disclose a material issue of fact, the issue must be resolved at trial.” RCW 59.12.130; *Pleasant*, 126 Wash.App. at 392, 109 P.3d 422.8

VI. CONCLUSION

RELIEF SOUGHT
**THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW, REVERSE BOTH
INFERIOR COURTS, DISMISS BOTH OF RESPONDENT’S
CAUSES OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE ON ALL GROUNDS
SAVE LACK OF JURISDICTION, THIS COURT SHOULD
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES AND TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF PETITIONER’S COA AND TRIAL COURT BRIEFING ON
THE ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE. THIS COURT SHOULD
REMAND TO THE SUPERIOR COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

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II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FOR REVIEW

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to plaintiff's claim the trial court was vested with jurisdiction over the property under authority RCW 59.18.055. Is the insufficiency of service defense established where, as here, the *plaintiff* endeavored to serve alternative process, notwithstanding CR 4(c), CR 4(c) states service shall be by the sheriff of the county wherein the service is made, or by the sheriff's deputy, or by any person over 18 years of age who is competent to be a witness in the action, *other than a party*.

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Because this case involves a residential tenancy, it is governed by the Residential Landlord–Tenant Act (RLTA) of 1973, chapter 59.18 RCW. *Leda v. Whisnand*, 150 Wash.App. 69, 77, 207 P.3d 468 2009). However, the procedures set forth in the generalized unlawful detainer statutes, chapter 59.12 RCW, “apply to the extent they are not supplanted by those found in the [RLTA].” *Pleasant*, 126 Wash.App. at 390, 109 P.3d 422.

VI. CONCLUSION


RELIEF SOUGHT

This court should grant review, reverse both inferior courts, dismiss both of respondent’s causes of action with prejudice on all grounds save lack of jurisdiction, this court should award attorney fees and take judicial

notice of petitioner's COA and trial court briefing on the attorney fee issue.
This court should remand to the Superior court with instructions to award
petitioner attorney fees at the trial court level.

DATED: October 14, 2018

Respectfully submitted by:


STANLEY MAYNOR

APPENDIX

*HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, a
public body corporate and politic, Respondent,
v.
STANLEY MAYNOR, Appellant.*

[No. 76553-1-I.](#)

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.

Filed: July 30, 2018.

Appeal from King County Superior Court, Docket No: 16-2-27151-1,
Judgment or order under review, Date filed: 02/13/2017, Judge signing:
Honorable John R Ruhl.

Stanley Maynor (Appearing Pro Se), 5423 35th Avenue S.w., Seattle, WA,
98126, Counsel for Appellant.

L. J. Brosell, Seattle Housing Authority, 190 Queen Anne Ave N, Seattle, WA,
98109-4968, Counsel for Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BECKER, J.

In December 2016, the Seattle Housing Authority evicted appellant Stanley Maynor from an apartment in South Seattle. Maynor appeals the orders leading to that eviction. We affirm.

The Housing Authority began eviction proceedings in October 2016 after Maynor breached his lease by nonpayment of rent. Maynor was served with a 14 day notice to pay rent or vacate on October 13, 2016, through a notice posted on his door. Maynor remained in possession of the unit. On November 7, the Housing Authority filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and an eviction summons and on November 9, the Housing Authority filed a motion and certificate for order to show cause why a writ of restitution should not be issued.

According to a declaration from a process server, several unsuccessful attempts were made to serve Maynor at his residence with the eviction summons, the complaint for unlawful detainer, and the 14 day notice to pay rent or vacate. After these efforts, the Housing Authority petitioned the court on November 16 for permission to utilize alternative service under RCW 59.18.055. That statute authorizes service by posting the summons and complaint in a conspicuous place on the premises and depositing copies of the summons and complaint in the mail, by both regular and certified mail. According to the statute, the plaintiff cannot obtain a money judgment when alternative service has been used. The court's authority "is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the plaintiff":

When service on the defendant or defendants is accomplished by this alternative procedure, the court's jurisdiction is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the plaintiff and no money judgment may be entered against the defendant or defendants until such time as jurisdiction over the defendant or defendants is obtained.

RCW 59.18.055(1)(b).

The Housing Authority obtained court permission for alternative service on November 16 and proceeded to make service by this method. An order for the show cause hearing was included in the documents thus served on Maynor. Maynor filed an "answer" on December 13, generally denying the complaint and claiming that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction because the summons and complaint were not hand delivered to him. He submitted a "partial statement of authorities" in which he challenged the court's jurisdiction and argued that he had not been properly served. In this document, Maynard asserted that he could not be liable to the Housing Authority for a money judgment. In this unique statutory context, his limited response did not constitute a personal submission to the court's jurisdiction. [Negash v. Sawyer, 131 Wn. App. 822, 825-27, 129 P.3d 824 \(2006\).](#)

The show cause hearing was held on December 19, 2016, before a King County Superior Court commissioner. The Housing Authority's property manager, Martha Owens, testified that Maynor failed to pay his rent on time. She quantified the amount of back rent that was due as well as the various costs incurred by the Housing Authority for conducting the eviction. Maynor was present at the hearing. He did not dispute that he was behind in his rent.

Based on documents in the file, the commissioner concluded service of the summons and complaint had been done properly. At the end of the hearing, the commissioner issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order that found Maynor guilty of unlawful detainer and called for a writ of restitution to restore possession of the unit to the Housing Authority. The writ of restitution was issued on the same day. The commissioner entered a judgment summary for the Housing Authority as creditor and Maynor as debtor. The summary listed \$669 as the principal judgment amount, \$890 in attorney fees and costs, and other expenses, but all these items were designated "Reserved." Conclusion of law 1 stated, "This court has jurisdiction over the property but because of alternative service, does not have personal jurisdiction in this case." Conclusion of law 3 stated, in accordance with RCW 59.18.055, that "plaintiff is not entitled to the amounts identified in the summary until the court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant." So far as the record reflects, the court never entered judgment against Maynor for the itemized amounts listed in the judgment summary.

Maynor filed a motion to revise on December 27, 2016. He was evicted on December 29.

The superior court heard Maynor's motion to revise in February 2017. After oral argument, the trial court adopted as its own the commissioner's findings, conclusions, the order finding Maynor in unlawful detainer, the order to issue a writ and the related writ. The court denied Maynor's motion to revise. Maynor appeals.

ANALYSIS

Alternative Service

Maynor contends that neither the commissioner nor the trial court had jurisdiction over the property due to an alleged failure to comply with the portion of the alternative service statute, RCW 59.18.055, that requires posting of certain documents. However, a declaration from Martha Owens stated that the required documents were posted on Maynor's door on November 30. Proof of mailing was also presented. The commissioner entered a finding of fact that Maynor was served via alternative service. We conclude that the alternative service procedure was complied with and the superior court had jurisdiction to restore possession of the premises to the Housing Authority.

Commissioner's Powers

Maynor contends that the commissioner who presided over the December 19 show cause hearing acted ultra vires, and as a consequence the findings, conclusions, and orders entered by the commissioner and adopted by the superior court are void.

Maynor cites a statute stating that a plaintiff, at the time of commencing an action for unlawful detainer, may apply to "the judge of the court in which the action is pending" for a writ of restitution. RCW 59.12.090. According to Maynard, the use of the term "judge" shows that a commissioner does not have authority to issue a writ of restitution. He is incorrect. Commissioners have the "power, authority, and jurisdiction, *concurrent with the superior court and the judge thereof*, . . . to hear and determine ex parte and uncontested civil matters of any nature." RCW 2.24.040(9) (emphasis added). Also, as the Housing Authority explains, RCW 59.12.090 does not apply in this residential landlord-tenant dispute.

Under the King County Local Rules, an order to show cause in an unlawful detainer action can be obtained ex parte. The initial hearing on an order to show cause is to be "heard in person in the Ex Parte and Probate Department," except that contested proceedings are to be set for a trial and assigned to a judge.

The orders to show cause, and any agreed orders or orders that do not require notice, shall be obtained by presenting the orders, through the clerk's office, to the Ex Parte and Probate Department, without oral argument. The initial hearing on order to show cause shall be heard in person in the Ex Parte and Probate Department, *provided that contested proceedings may be referred by the judicial officer to the clerk who will issue a trial date and a case schedule and will assign the case to a judge.*

KCLR 40.1(b)(2)(O) (emphasis added). Maynor contends that the show cause hearing on December 19 was a contested proceeding that should have been referred to a judge for trial.

The commissioner heard the initial show cause hearing as provided by KCLR 40.1. It was undisputed that Maynor was behind on his rent. Maynor argued that alternative service should not be permitted. But as discussed above, RCW 59.18.055 authorizes the alternative service that was used by the Housing Authority. Making an unfounded argument about the law does not transform a show cause hearing into a contested proceeding.

At the hearing on his motion to revise, Maynor argued that the show cause hearing was contested because he disputed the amounts the Housing Authority claimed he owed. The superior court judge addressed this argument and determined that the show cause hearing was not contested as to any material fact:

The commissioner has the authority to issue an order in uncontested matters, and for purposes of that statement, uncontested means matters in which there is no reasonable dispute of any fact. Here, there is no dispute that an insufficient amount of money had been tendered by the defendant to the Housing Authority. And if there's no disagreement about that, then there's no dispute. And that triggers the commissioner's authority at that point to go ahead and issue an order if there is no dispute of any material fact. . . . And although Mr. Maynor disputes that he owes any money beyond what he's paid, there is no dispute that what he offered was insufficient to cure an untimely, as well as insufficient to cure the default. So the commissioner did have the authority to hear this case. It was uncontested because there was no dispute of serious—of material fact regarding the elements that the Housing Authority had to file—had to prove.

The superior court was correct. It would have been pointless to refer the case for a trial before a judge since there were no contested material facts.

Due Process

At minimum, a defendant subject to an action for unlawful detainer must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard. [Leda v. Whisnand, 150 Wn. App. 69, 83, 207 P.3d 468 \(2009\)](#). Maynor alleges that the Housing Authority violated due process by concealing from him the nature of the December 19 show cause hearing. According to Maynor, that hearing was transformed into a "faux" trial on the merits. He says it was a "charade" and a "debacle" because he was prevented from exercising his "right to subpoena witnesses, his right to file a jury demand, his right to cross examine and his right to a real judgment." He says the trial court infringed his right to procedural due process by "rendering judgment against him without any prior notice and without any opportunity to be heard." This argument lacks merit. The 14 day notice and the eviction summons advised Maynor of the procedure for contesting eviction. The complaint for unlawful detainer set forth the relief sought. Maynor filed an answer to the complaint. There is no substance to Maynor's claim that he lacked notice of what the show cause hearing would entail.

The opportunity to be heard is distinct from the right to a full trial. It is undisputed that a defendant at a show cause hearing "is not entitled to a full trial. Moreover, it is well established that due process does not require that a defendant in an unlawful detainer action be allowed direct and cross-examination of parties and witnesses at the show cause hearing." [Leda, 150 Wn. App. at 81](#) (citations omitted). Maynor was allowed to argue at the show cause hearing, he was free to present evidence, and he was given an opportunity to cross-examine the Housing Authority's witness. Maynor received a meaningful opportunity to be heard to the extent required under Leda.

Five Day Notice of Orders and Factual Findings

Maynor contends the commissioner erred by entering "judgment" notwithstanding the fact that the Housing Authority did not provide five days' notice of the proposed judgment, findings of fact, and conclusions of law that were presented at the hearing on December 19. Maynor contends such notice is required by CR 52 and CR 54.

Unlawful detainer actions governed by RCW 59.18 are "special statutory proceedings with the limited purpose of hastening recovery of possession of rental property." [Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wn. App. 382, 386, 628 P.2d 506 \(1981\)](#). Court rules do not apply when inconsistent with rules or statutes applicable to special proceedings. CR 81. At a show cause hearing, "if it shall appear that the plaintiff has the right to be restored to possession of the property, the court shall enter an order directing the issuance of a writ of restitution." RCW 59.18.380. The civil rules requiring five days' notice of a proposed judgment do not apply because they are inconsistent with the statute's mandate for expeditious action restoring the premises to a prevailing plaintiff.

Furthermore, CR 52 and CR 54 presuppose that a trial has occurred in which disputed issues of fact were resolved. Here, there was no trial because there were no contested issues of material fact. Maynor wished to contest the amounts the Housing Authority claimed he owed, but because of the use of alternative service, this dispute was not properly before the commissioner. The commissioner reserved judgment on the claim for moneys owed until such time as the court had in personam jurisdiction.

Execution of the Writ

Maynor contends the writ of restitution was prematurely executed in violation of CR 62(a), which provides that "no execution shall issue upon a judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 10 days after its entry."

Maynor does not explain how CR 62 can apply to an eviction. The eviction was done pursuant to a writ of restitution, not in proceedings taken to enforce an ordinary judgment. A judgment for restitution of the premises is to be enforced immediately. RCW 59.18.410.

But even if CR 62 has application, the writ of restitution was issued on December 19. The sheriff executed the writ on December 29, ejecting Maynor from the premises. Ten days passed between the issuance and execution of the writ. Thus, there is no basis for this claim.

Attorney Fees

The Housing Authority requests reasonable attorney fees under RCW 59.18.290, a section of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973. An award of costs and attorney fees under RCW 59.18.290 is discretionary. [Council House, Inc. v. Hawk, 136 Wn. App. 153, 159, 147 P.3d 1305 \(2006\)](#). Exercising our discretion, we decline to award attorney fees.

Affirmed.

J. LEACH and SCHINDLER, JJ., concurs.

FILED

9/13/2018

Court of Appeals

Division I

State of Washington

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY)

OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, a) No. 76553-1-1

public body corporate and politic,)

) **ORDER DENYING MOTION**

Respondent,) FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)

v.)

)

STANLEY MAYNOR,)

)

Appellant.)

)

Appellant Stanley Maynor has filed a motion for reconsideration of the opinion filed in the above matter on July 30, 2018. Respondent Housing Authority of the City of Seattle has not filed a response to appellant's motion. The court has determined that appellant's motion should be denied. Now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that appellant's motion for reconsideration is denied.

FOR THE COURT:

Rules

CR 4

PROCESS

(c) By Whom Served. Service of summons and process, except when service is by publication, shall be by the sheriff of the county wherein the service is made, or by the sheriff's deputy, or by any person over 18 years of age who is competent to be a witness in the action, **other than a party.**

SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS
CR 5

(a) Service--When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of

judgment, designation of record on appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.

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Statutes

RCW 59.12.030

Unlawful detainer defined.

A tenant of real property for a term less than life is guilty of unlawful detainer either:

(3) When he or she continues in possession in person or by subtenant after a default in the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, served (in manner in RCW 59.12.040 provided) in behalf of the person entitled to the rent upon the person owing it, has remained uncomplished with for the period of three days after service thereof. The notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;

RCW 59.12.070

Complaint—Summons.

The plaintiff in his or her complaint, which shall be in writing, must set forth the facts on which he or she seeks to recover, and describe the premises with reasonable certainty, and may set forth therein any circumstances of fraud, force or violence, which may have accompanied the forcible entry or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim damages therefor, or compensation for the occupation of the premises, or both; in case the unlawful detainer charged be after default in the payment of rent, the complaint must state the amount of such rent. A summons must be issued as in other cases, returnable at a day designated therein, which shall not be less than seven nor more than thirty days from the date of service, except in cases where the publication of summons is necessary, in which case the court or judge thereof may order that the summons be made returnable at such time as may be deemed proper, and the summons shall specify the return day so fixed.

RCW 59.12.085

Alternative service of summons—Limitation on jurisdiction.

(1) When the plaintiff, after the exercise of due diligence, is unable to personally serve the summons on the defendant or defendants, the court may authorize the alternative means of service described in this section.

(2) Upon filing of an affidavit from the person or persons attempting service describing those attempts, and the filing of an affidavit from the plaintiff, plaintiff's agent, or plaintiff's attorney stating the belief that the defendant or defendants cannot be found, the court may enter an order authorizing service of the summons as follows:

(a) The summons and complaint must be posted in a conspicuous place on the premises unlawfully held not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons; and

(b) Copies of the summons and complaint must be

deposited in the mail, postage prepaid, by both regular mail and certified mail directed to the defendant or defendants' last known address not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons.

(3) When service on the defendant or defendants is accomplished by this alternative procedure, the court's jurisdiction is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the plaintiff and no money judgment may be entered against the defendant or defendants until jurisdiction over the defendant or defendants is obtained.

RCW 59.12.090

Writ of restitution—Bond.

The plaintiff at the time of commencing an action of forcible entry or detainer or unlawful detainer, or at any time afterwards, may apply to the judge of the court in which the action is pending for a writ of restitution restoring to the plaintiff the property in the complaint described, and the judge shall order a writ of restitution to issue. The writ shall be issued by the clerk of the superior court in which the action is pending, and be returnable in twenty days after its date; but before any writ shall issue prior to judgment the plaintiff shall execute to the defendant and file in court a bond in such sum as the court or judge may order, with sufficient surety to be approved by the clerk, conditioned that the plaintiff will prosecute his or her action without delay, and will pay all costs that may be adjudged to the defendant, and all damages which he or she may sustain by reason of the writ of restitution having been issued, should the same be wrongfully sued out.

RCW 59.18.055

Notice—Alternative procedure—Court's jurisdiction limited—Application to chapter 59.20 RCW.

(1) When the plaintiff, after the exercise of due diligence, is unable to personally serve the summons on the defendant, the court may authorize the alternative means of service described herein. Upon filing of an affidavit from

the person or persons attempting service describing those attempts, and the filing of an affidavit from the plaintiff, plaintiff's agent, or plaintiff's attorney stating the belief that the defendant cannot be found, the court may enter an order authorizing service of the summons as follows:

(a) The summons and complaint shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the premises unlawfully held, not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons; and

(b) Copies of the summons and complaint shall be deposited in the mail, postage prepaid, by both regular mail and certified mail directed to the defendant's or defendants' last known address not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons.

When service on the defendant or defendants is accomplished by this alternative procedure, the court's jurisdiction is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the plaintiff and no money judgment may be entered against the defendant or defendants until such time as jurisdiction over the defendant or defendants is obtained.

(2) This section shall apply to this chapter and chapter 59.20 RCW

RCW 59.18.365

Unlawful detainer action—Summons—Form.

(1) The summons must contain the names of the parties to the proceeding, the attorney or attorneys if any, the court in which the same is brought, the nature of the action, in concise terms, and the relief sought, and also the return day; and must notify the defendant to appear

and answer within the time designated or that the relief sought will be taken against him or her. The summons must contain a street address for service of the notice of appearance or answer and, if available, a facsimile number for the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, if represented. The summons must be served and returned in the same manner as a summons in other actions is served and returned.

(2) A defendant may serve a copy of an answer or notice of appearance by any of the following methods:

(a) By delivering a copy of the answer or notice of appearance to the person who signed the summons at the street address listed on the summons;

(b) By mailing a copy of the answer or notice of appearance addressed to the person who signed the summons to the street address listed on the summons;

(c) By facsimile to the facsimile number listed on the summons. Service by facsimile is complete upon successful transmission to the facsimile number listed upon the summons;

(d) As otherwise authorized by the superior court civil rules.

(3) The summons for unlawful detainer actions for tenancies covered by this chapter shall be substantially in the following form:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND
FOR COUNTY

Plaintiff,

-
-
-

-
-
-
-

NO.

vs.
EVICTON SUMMONS

(Residential)

Defendant.

THIS IS NOTICE OF A LAWSUIT TO EVICT YOU.
PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.

THE DEADLINE FOR YOUR WRITTEN
RESPONSE IS: 5:00 p.m., on

TO: (Name)

. (Address)

This is notice of a lawsuit to evict you from the property which you are renting. Your landlord is asking the court to terminate your tenancy, direct the sheriff to remove you and your belongings from the property, enter a money judgment against you for unpaid rent and/or damages for your use of the property, and for court costs and attorneys' fees.

If you want to defend yourself in this lawsuit, you must respond to the eviction complaint in writing on or before the deadline stated above. You must respond in writing even if no case number has been assigned by the court yet.

You can respond to the complaint in writing by delivering a copy of a notice of appearance or answer to your landlord's attorney (or your landlord if there is no attorney)

by personal delivery, mailing, or facsimile to the address or facsimile number stated below **TO BE RECEIVED NO LATER THAN THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE**. Service by facsimile is complete upon successful transmission to the facsimile number, if any, listed in the summons.

The notice of appearance or answer must include the name of this case (plaintiff(s) and defendant(s)), your name, the street address where further legal papers may be sent, your telephone number (if any), and your signature.

If there is a number on the upper right side of the eviction summons and complaint, you must also file your original notice of appearance or answer with the court clerk by the deadline for your written response.

You may demand that the plaintiff file this lawsuit with the court. If you do so, the demand must be in writing and must be served upon the person signing the summons.

Within fourteen days after you serve the demand, the plaintiff must file this lawsuit with the court, or the service on you of this summons and complaint will be void.

If you wish to seek the advice of an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written response, if any, may be served on time.

You may also be instructed in a separate order to appear for a court hearing on your eviction. If you receive an order to show cause you must personally appear at the hearing on the date indicated in the order to show cause **IN ADDITION** to delivering and filing your notice of appearance or answer by the deadline stated above.

IF YOU DO NOT RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT IN WRITING BY THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE YOU WILL LOSE BY DEFAULT. YOUR LANDLORD MAY PROCEED WITH THE LAWSUIT, EVEN IF YOU HAVE MOVED OUT OF THE PROPERTY.

The notice of appearance or answer must be delivered to:

.....

Name

.....

Street Address

.....


Telephone Number

Facsimile Number (Required if Available)

rd petitioner attorney fees at the trial court level.

DATED: October 14, 2018

Respectfully submitted by:


STANLEY MAYNOR

APPENDIX

11

**HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, a
public body corporate and politic, Respondent,**

v.

STANLEY MAYNOR, Appellant.

[No. 76553-1-I.](#)

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.

Filed: July 30, 2018.

Appeal from King County Superior Court, Docket No: 16-2-27151-1, Judgment or order under review, Date filed: 02/13/2017, Judge signing: Honorable John R Ruhl.

Stanley Maynor (Appearing Pro Se), 5423 35th Avenue S.w., Seattle, WA, 98126, Counsel for Appellant.

L. J. Brosell, Seattle Housing Authority, 190 Queen Anne Ave N, Seattle, WA, 98109-4968, Counsel for Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BECKER, J.

In December 2016, the Seattle Housing Authority evicted appellant Stanley Maynor from an apartment in South Seattle. Maynor appeals the orders leading to that eviction. We affirm.

The Housing Authority began eviction proceedings in October 2016 after Maynor breached his lease by nonpayment of rent. Maynor was served with a 14 day notice to pay rent or vacate on October 13, 2016, through a notice posted on his door. Maynor remained in possession of the unit. On November 7, the Housing Authority filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and an eviction summons and on November 9, the Housing Authority filed a motion and certificate for order to show cause why a writ of restitution should not be issued.

According to a declaration from a process server, several unsuccessful attempts were made to serve Maynor at his residence with the eviction summons, the complaint for unlawful detainer, and the 14 day notice to pay rent or vacate. After these efforts, the Housing Authority petitioned the court on November 16 for permission to utilize alternative service under RCW 59.18.055. That statute authorizes service by posting the summons and complaint in a conspicuous place on the premises and depositing copies of the summons and complaint in the mail, by both regular and certified mail. According to the statute, the plaintiff cannot obtain a money judgment when alternative service has been used. The court's authority "is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the plaintiff":

When service on the defendant or defendants is accomplished by this alternative procedure, the court's jurisdiction is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the plaintiff and no money judgment may be entered against the defendant or defendants until such time as jurisdiction over the defendant or defendants is obtained.

RCW 59.18.055(1)(b).

The Housing Authority obtained court permission for alternative service on November 16 and proceeded to make service by this method. An order for the show cause hearing was included in the documents thus served on Maynor. Maynor filed an "answer" on December 13, generally denying the

complaint and claiming that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction because the summons and complaint were not hand delivered to him. He submitted a "partial statement of authorities" in which he challenged the court's jurisdiction and argued that he had not been properly served. In this document, Maynard asserted that he could not be liable to the Housing Authority for a money judgment. In this unique statutory context, his limited response did not constitute a personal submission to the court's jurisdiction. [Negash v. Sawyer, 131 Wn. App. 822, 825-27, 129 P.3d 824 \(2006\).](#)

The show cause hearing was held on December 19, 2016, before a King County Superior Court commissioner. The Housing Authority's property manager, Martha Owens, testified that Maynor failed to pay his rent on time. She quantified the amount of back rent that was due as well as the various costs incurred by the Housing Authority for conducting the eviction. Maynor was present at the hearing. He did not dispute that he was behind in his rent.

Based on documents in the file, the commissioner concluded service of the summons and complaint had been done properly. At the end of the hearing, the commissioner issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order that found Maynor guilty of unlawful detainer and called for a writ of restitution to restore possession of the unit to the Housing Authority. The writ of restitution was issued on the same day. The commissioner entered a judgment summary for the Housing Authority as creditor and Maynor as debtor. The summary listed \$669 as the principal judgment amount, \$890 in attorney fees and costs, and other expenses, but all these items were designated "Reserved." Conclusion of law 1 stated, "This court has jurisdiction over the property but because of alternative service, does not have personal jurisdiction in this case." Conclusion of law 3 stated, in accordance with RCW 59.18.055, that "plaintiff is not entitled to the amounts identified in the summary until the court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant." So far as the record reflects, the court never entered judgment against Maynor for the itemized amounts listed in the judgment summary.

Maynor filed a motion to revise on December 27, 2016. He was evicted on December 29.

The superior court heard Maynor's motion to revise in February 2017. After oral argument, the trial court adopted as its own the commissioner's findings, conclusions, the order finding Maynor in unlawful detainer, the order to issue a writ and the related writ. The court denied Maynor's motion to revise. Maynor appeals.

ANALYSIS

Alternative Service

Maynor contends that neither the commissioner nor the trial court had jurisdiction over the property due to an alleged failure to comply with the portion of the alternative service statute, RCW 59.18.055, that requires posting of certain documents. However, a declaration from Martha Owens stated that the required documents were posted on Maynor's door on November 30. Proof of mailing was also presented. The commissioner entered a finding of fact that Maynor was served via alternative service. We conclude that the alternative service procedure was complied with and the superior court had jurisdiction to restore possession of the premises to the Housing Authority.

Commissioner's Powers

Maynor contends that the commissioner who presided over the December 19 show cause hearing acted ultra vires, and as a consequence the findings, conclusions, and orders entered by the commissioner and adopted by the superior court are void.

Maynor cites a statute stating that a plaintiff, at the time of commencing an action for unlawful detainer, may apply to "the judge of the court in which the action is pending" for a writ of restitution. RCW 59.12.090. According to Maynard, the use of the term "judge" shows that a commissioner does not have authority to issue a writ of restitution. He is incorrect. Commissioners have the "power, authority, and jurisdiction, *concurrent with the superior court and the judge thereof*, . . . to hear and determine ex parte and uncontested civil matters of any nature." RCW 2.24.040(9) (emphasis added). Also, as the Housing Authority explains, RCW 59.12.090 does not apply in this residential landlord-tenant dispute.

Under the King County Local Rules, an order to show cause in an unlawful detainer action can be obtained ex parte. The initial hearing on an order to show cause is to be "heard in person in the Ex Parte and Probate Department," except that contested proceedings are to be set for a trial and assigned to a judge.

The orders to show cause, and any agreed orders or orders that do not require notice, shall be obtained by presenting the orders, through the clerk's office, to the Ex Parte and Probate Department, without oral argument. The initial hearing on order to show cause shall be heard in person in the Ex Parte and Probate Department, *provided that contested proceedings may be referred by the judicial officer to the clerk who will issue a trial date and a case schedule and will assign the case to a judge*.

KCLR 40.1(b)(2)(O) (emphasis added). Maynor contends that the show cause hearing on December 19 was a contested proceeding that should have been referred to a judge for trial.

The commissioner heard the initial show cause hearing as provided by KCLR 40.1. It was undisputed that Maynor was behind on his rent. Maynor argued that alternative service should not be permitted. But as discussed above, RCW 59.18.055 authorizes the alternative service that was used by the Housing Authority. Making an unfounded argument about the law does not transform a show cause hearing into a contested proceeding.

At the hearing on his motion to revise, Maynor argued that the show cause hearing was contested because he disputed the amounts the Housing Authority claimed he owed. The superior court judge addressed this argument and determined that the show cause hearing was not contested as to any material fact:

The commissioner has the authority to issue an order in uncontested matters, and for purposes of that statement, uncontested means matters in which there is no reasonable dispute of any fact. Here, there is no dispute that an insufficient amount of money had been tendered by the defendant to the Housing Authority. And if there's no disagreement about that, then there's no dispute. And that triggers the commissioner's authority at that point to go ahead and issue an order if there is no dispute of any material fact. . . . And although Mr. Maynor disputes that he owes any money beyond what he's paid, there is no dispute that what he offered was insufficient to cure an untimely, as well as insufficient to cure the default. So the commissioner did have the authority to hear this case. It was uncontested because there was no dispute of serious—of material fact regarding the elements that the Housing Authority had to file—had to prove.

The superior court was correct. It would have been pointless to refer the case for a trial before a judge since there were no contested material facts.

Due Process

At minimum, a defendant subject to an action for unlawful detainer must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard. [Leda v. Whisnand, 150 Wn. App. 69, 83, 207 P.3d 468 \(2009\)](#). Maynor alleges that the Housing Authority violated due process by concealing from him the nature of the December 19 show cause hearing. According to Maynor, that hearing was transformed into a "faux" trial on the merits. He says it was a "charade" and a "debacle" because he was prevented from exercising his "right to subpoena witnesses, his right to file a jury demand, his right to cross examine and his right to a real judgment." He says the trial court infringed his right to procedural due process by "rendering judgment against him without any prior notice and without any opportunity to be heard." This argument lacks merit. The 14 day notice and the eviction summons advised Maynor of the procedure for contesting eviction. The complaint for unlawful detainer set forth the relief sought. Maynor filed an answer to the complaint. There is no substance to Maynor's claim that he lacked notice of what the show cause hearing would entail.

The opportunity to be heard is distinct from the right to a full trial. It is undisputed that a defendant at a show cause hearing "is not entitled to a full trial. Moreover, it is well established that due process does not require that a defendant in an unlawful detainer action be allowed direct and cross-examination of parties and witnesses at the show cause hearing." [Leda, 150 Wn. App. at 81](#) (citations omitted). Maynor was allowed to argue at the show cause hearing, he was free to present evidence, and he was given an opportunity to cross-examine the Housing Authority's witness. Maynor received a meaningful opportunity to be heard to the extent required under *Leda*.

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Maynor contends the commissioner erred by entering "judgment" notwithstanding the fact that the Housing Authority did not provide five days' notice of the proposed judgment, findings of fact, and conclusions of law that were presented at the hearing on December 19. Maynor contends such notice is required by CR 52 and CR 54.

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Furthermore, CR 52 and CR 54 presuppose that a trial has occurred in which disputed issues of fact were resolved. Here, there was no trial because there were no contested issues of material fact. Maynor wished to contest the amounts the Housing Authority claimed he owed, but because of the use of alternative service, this dispute was not properly before the commissioner. The commissioner reserved judgment on the claim for moneys owed until such time as the court had in personam jurisdiction.

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Affirmed.

J. LEACH and SCHINDLER, JJ., concurs.

FILED

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HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY)

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FOR THE COURT:

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CR 4

PROCESS

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CR 4

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RCW 59.12.030

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(3) When he or she continues in possession in person or by subtenant after a default in the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, served (in manner in RCW 59.12.040 provided) in behalf of the person entitled to the rent upon the person owing it, has remained uncomplished with for the period of three days after service thereof. The notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;

RCW 59.12.070

Complaint—Summons.

The plaintiff in his or her complaint, which shall be in writing, must set forth the facts on which he or she seeks to recover, and describe the premises with reasonable certainty, and may set forth therein any circumstances of fraud, force or violence, which may have accompanied the forcible entry or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim damages therefor, or compensation for the occupation of the premises, or both; in case the unlawful detainer

charged be after default in the payment of rent, the complaint must state the amount of such rent. A summons must be issued as in other cases, returnable at a day designated therein, which shall not be less than seven nor more than thirty days from the date of service, except in cases where the publication of summons is necessary, in which case the court or judge thereof may order that the summons be made returnable at such time as may be deemed proper, and the summons shall specify the return day so fixed.

RCW 59.12.085

Alternative service of summons—Limitation on jurisdiction.

- (1) When the plaintiff, after the exercise of due diligence, is unable to personally serve the summons on the defendant or defendants, the court may authorize the alternative means of service described in this section.
- (2) Upon filing of an affidavit from the person or persons attempting service describing those attempts, and the filing of an affidavit from the plaintiff, plaintiff's agent, or plaintiff's attorney stating the belief that the defendant or defendants cannot be found, the court may enter an order authorizing service of the summons as follows:
 - (a) The summons and complaint must be posted in a conspicuous place on the premises unlawfully held not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons; and
 - (b) Copies of the summons and complaint must be deposited in the mail, postage prepaid, by both regular mail and certified mail directed to the defendant or defendants' last known address not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons.
- (3) When service on the defendant or defendants is accomplished by this alternative procedure, the court's jurisdiction is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the plaintiff and no money judgment may be entered against the defendant or defendants until jurisdiction over the defendant or defendants is obtained.

RCW 59.12.090

Writ of restitution—Bond.

The plaintiff at the time of commencing an action of forcible entry or detainer or unlawful detainer, or at any time afterwards, may apply to the judge of the court in which the action is pending for a writ of restitution restoring to the plaintiff the property in the complaint described, and the judge shall order a writ of restitution to issue. The writ shall be issued by the clerk of the superior

court in which the action is pending, and be returnable in twenty days after its date; but before any writ shall issue prior to judgment the plaintiff shall execute to the defendant and file in court a bond in such sum as the court or judge may order, with sufficient surety to be approved by the clerk, conditioned that the plaintiff will prosecute his or her action without delay, and will pay all costs that may be adjudged to the defendant, and all damages which he or she may sustain by reason of the writ of restitution having been issued, should the same be wrongfully sued out.

RCW 59.18.055

Notice—Alternative procedure—Court's jurisdiction limited—Application to chapter 59.20 RCW.

(1) When the plaintiff, after the exercise of due diligence, is unable to personally serve the summons on the defendant, the court may authorize the alternative means of service described herein. Upon filing of an affidavit from the person or persons attempting service describing those attempts, and the filing of an affidavit from the plaintiff, plaintiff's agent, or plaintiff's attorney stating the belief that the defendant cannot be found, the court may enter an order authorizing service of the summons as follows:

(a) The summons and complaint shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the premises unlawfully held, not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons; and

(b) Copies of the summons and complaint shall be deposited in the mail, postage prepaid, by both regular mail and certified mail directed to the defendant's or defendants' last known address not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons.

When service on the defendant or defendants is accomplished by this alternative procedure, the court's jurisdiction is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the plaintiff and no money judgment may be entered against the defendant or defendants until such time as jurisdiction over the defendant or defendants is obtained.

(2) This section shall apply to this chapter and chapter 59.20 RCW

RCW 59.18.365

Unlawful detainer action—Summons—Form.

(1) The summons must contain the names of the parties to the proceeding, the attorney or attorneys if any, the court in which the same is brought, the nature of the action, in concise terms, and the relief sought, and also the return day; and must notify the defendant to appear and answer within the time designated or that the relief sought will be taken against him or her. The summons must contain a street address for service of the notice of appearance or answer and, if available, a facsimile number for the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, if represented. The summons must be served and returned in the same manner as a summons in other actions is served and returned.

(2) A defendant may serve a copy of an answer or notice of appearance by any of the following methods:

(a) By delivering a copy of the answer or notice of appearance to the person who signed the summons at the street address listed on the summons;

(b) By mailing a copy of the answer or notice of appearance addressed to the person who signed the summons to the street address listed on the summons;

(c) By facsimile to the facsimile number listed on the summons. Service by facsimile is complete upon successful transmission to the facsimile number listed upon the summons;

(d) As otherwise authorized by the superior court civil rules.

(3) The summons for unlawful detainer actions for tenancies covered by this chapter shall be substantially in the following form:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND
FOR COUNTY

Plaintiff,

-
-
-
-
-
-

NO.

vs.
EVICTION SUMMONS

(Residential)

Defendant.

THIS IS NOTICE OF A LAWSUIT TO EVICT YOU.
PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.

THE DEADLINE FOR YOUR WRITTEN
RESPONSE IS: 5:00 p.m., on

TO: (Name)

. (Address)

This is notice of a lawsuit to evict you from the property which you are renting. Your landlord is asking the court to terminate your tenancy, direct the sheriff to remove you and your belongings from the property, enter a money judgment against you for unpaid rent and/or damages for your use of the property, and for court costs and attorneys' fees.

If you want to defend yourself in this lawsuit, you must respond to the eviction complaint in writing on or before the deadline stated above. You must respond in writing even if no case number has been assigned by the court yet.

You can respond to the complaint in writing by delivering a copy of a notice of appearance or answer to your landlord's attorney (or your landlord if there is no attorney) by personal delivery, mailing, or facsimile to the address or facsimile number stated below **TO BE RECEIVED NO LATER THAN THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE**. Service by facsimile is complete upon successful transmission to the facsimile number, if any, listed in the summons.

The notice of appearance or answer must include the name of this case (plaintiff(s) and defendant(s)), your name, the street address where further legal papers may be sent, your telephone number (if any), and your signature.

If there is a number on the upper right side of the eviction summons and complaint, you must also file your original notice of appearance or answer with the court clerk by the deadline for your written response.

You may demand that the plaintiff file this lawsuit with the court. If you do so, the demand must be in writing and must be served upon the person signing the summons. Within fourteen days after you serve the demand, the plaintiff must file this lawsuit with the court, or the service on you of this summons and complaint will be void.

If you wish to seek the advice of an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written response, if any, may be served on time.

You may also be instructed in a separate order to appear for a court hearing on your eviction. If you receive an order to show cause you must personally appear at the hearing on the date indicated in the order to show cause IN ADDITION to delivering and filing your notice of appearance or answer by the deadline stated above.

IF YOU DO NOT RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT IN WRITING BY THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE YOU WILL LOSE BY DEFAULT. YOUR LANDLORD MAY PROCEED WITH THE LAWSUIT, EVEN IF YOU HAVE MOVED OUT OF THE PROPERTY.

The notice of appearance or answer must be delivered to:

.....

Name

.....

Street Address

.....

Telephone Number

Facsimile Number (Required if Available)

NORMAN COHEN - FILING PRO SE

October 15, 2018 - 2:28 PM

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Court of Appeals Division I
Appellate Court Case Number: 76553-1
Appellate Court Case Title: Housing Authority of City of Seattle, Respondent v. Stanley Maynor, Appellant
Superior Court Case Number: 16-2-27151-1

The following documents have been uploaded:

- 765531_Petition_for_Review_20181015142540D1169065_0304.pdf
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Petition for Review
The Original File Name was final pfr.pdf

A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:

- lbrosell@seattlehousing.org
- linda.brosell@seattlehousing.org
- norman.cohen@gmail.com
- nwc39@comcast.net
- xyz39@comcast.net

Comments:

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5423 35th Avenue
Seattle, WA, 98126
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